ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
Wireless sensor networks has limited resource constraints in terms of energy and range which leads to many challenging and intriguing security-sensitive problems that cannot be handled using conventional security solutions. The broadcast nature of the transmission medium makes it prone to attacks using jammers which use the method of injecting interference signals, which is why they can be considered as the most critical and fatally adversarial threat that can disrupt the networks. Jamming attacks do not have to modify communication packets or compromise any sensors in order to launch the attack.This makes them difficult to detect and defend against. As a consequence, wireless sensor networks are further exposed to passive and active attacks. A malicious node initiates a passive attack [1] through inert observation of the ongoing communication, whereas an active attacker is involved in transmission as well.
f Sweep jamming technique [3] , the malicious node can jam multipl communication frequencies, but this jamming does not affect all the involved nodes . The attack also leads to packet loss and retransmission of packet data that will e consumption of energy in the network. . In Barrage jamming technique [4] , the malicious node jams a group of frequencies simultaneously which decreases the signal-to-noise ratio of the destination node. This jamming technique increases the range of jammed frequencies and reduces the output power of the jammed e jamming [5] has the capability to flood the network with useless data which can mislead the sensor nodes present in the network .The available bandwidth used by the sensor he malicious nodes that make use of this technique do not f Sweep jamming technique [3] , the malicious node can jam multiple does not affect all the involved nodes of packet data that will Figure 1 is an illustration of the types of jamming techniques used in general to launch jammer [4] , the malicious node jams a group of frequencies noise ratio of the destination node. This jamming technique increases the range of jammed frequencies and reduces the output power of the jammed e jamming [5] has the capability to flood the network with useless data which can mislead the sensor nodes present in the network .The available bandwidth used by the sensor do not reveal their Figure 2 depicts several types of jammers that may be used in attacks against wireless sensor networks namely constant jammer, deceptive jammer constant jammer [6] emits uninterrupted radio signals in the wireless medium. They do not follow any underlying MAC protocol and include just random bits. This jammer keeps the channel busy and disturbs the communication between the nodes. The deceptive j jamming techniques to attack the wireless sensor nodes. The random jammer [8] sleeps for an indiscriminate time and wakes up to jam the network for an arbitrary time. The last jamming approach indicated above is the reactive jamme channel. On detection of legitimate activity, the jammer node immediately sends out a random signal to disrupt the valid communication
System Architecture
The inference after comparing the above mentioned jamming attacks is that reactive jamming is a far more destructive attack that paper considers the reactive jammer attack since it networks as the reactive jammer nodes can disrupt the message delivery of its neighbouring sensor nodes with strong interference signals. The consequences of the attack are the loss of link reliability, increased energy consumption, extended packet delays, and disruption of end routes.
This work presents system architecture description of the overall trigger the set of sufferer nodes .These nodes are testing is carried out at the base station procedure to identify each individual node can be stored locally for use by routing schemes or can be sent Figure 2 depicts several types of jammers that may be used in attacks against wireless sensor networks namely constant jammer, deceptive jammer ,random jammer and reactive jammer. The constant jammer [6] emits uninterrupted radio signals in the wireless medium. They do not follow any underlying MAC protocol and include just random bits. This jammer keeps the channel busy and disturbs the communication between the nodes. The deceptive jammer [7] uses misleading jamming techniques to attack the wireless sensor nodes. The random jammer [8] sleeps for an indiscriminate time and wakes up to jam the network for an arbitrary time. The last jamming approach indicated above is the reactive jammer [9] which listens for on-going activity on the channel. On detection of legitimate activity, the jammer node immediately sends out a random valid communication signals prevalent on the channel leading to collision.
The inference after comparing the above mentioned jamming attacks is that reactive jamming is a that opposes secure communication in wireless sensor network. This s the reactive jammer attack since it poses a critical threat to wireless sensor reactive jammer nodes can disrupt the message delivery of its neighbouring sensor nodes with strong interference signals. The consequences of the attack are the loss of link d energy consumption, extended packet delays, and disruption of end Figure 2 depicts several types of jammers that may be used in attacks against wireless sensor reactive jammer. The constant jammer [6] emits uninterrupted radio signals in the wireless medium. They do not follow any underlying MAC protocol and include just random bits. This jammer keeps the channel busy ammer [7] uses misleading jamming techniques to attack the wireless sensor nodes. The random jammer [8] sleeps for an indiscriminate time and wakes up to jam the network for an arbitrary time. The last jamming going activity on the channel. On detection of legitimate activity, the jammer node immediately sends out a random prevalent on the channel leading to collision.
The inference after comparing the above mentioned jamming attacks is that reactive jamming is a secure communication in wireless sensor network. This ireless sensor reactive jammer nodes can disrupt the message delivery of its neighbouring sensor nodes with strong interference signals. The consequences of the attack are the loss of link d energy consumption, extended packet delays, and disruption of end-to-end for defense against reactive jamming attack. The initial identification of . Once the group locally execute the testing as a trigger or non trigger. The identification outcomes base station for jamming localization process. The rest of the work is organized model, and the attacker model along with jamming characteristics. implementation approach for Section 4 describes the performance evaluation along with evaluation of the time taken to execute the testing rounds and also the message complexity.
SYSTEM MODELS AND NOTATION

Network Model
The model considers a wireless sensor network station. Each sensor node has omni total of k channels throughout the network, where k>m. is considered to be uniform, so the transmission constant r and the network is modelled as a unit disk graph (UDG). w said to be connected if the Euclidean
Attacker model
The jammer nodes can sense an ongoing transmission to decide whether jamming signal depending on the power of the sensed reactive jammers have omnidirectional antennas with uniform power strength on each direction which is similar to the property of the sensors. The jammed area lies on the centre of the network area, with a radius R, where jammer range greater than the range of all the sensors in the network jammer model. All the sensors within this range will be jammed during the jammer wake period. The value of R can be calculated based on victim nodes in the networks. Another assumption is that any two jammer nodes are not in close range with each other so as to maximize the jammed area. The rest of the work is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the network model, and the attacker model along with jamming characteristics. Section 3 trigger identification service by making use of group testing performance evaluation by analysis of the time complexity involved along with evaluation of the time taken to execute the testing rounds and also the message
Sensor model
SYSTEM MODELS AND NOTATION
wireless sensor network that consists of n sensor nodes and one base Each sensor node has omni-directional antennas, along with m radios that adds up to a total of k channels throughout the network, where k>m. Here the power strength in each to be uniform, so the transmission range of each sensor can be considered as is modelled as a unit disk graph (UDG). where any node pair ( uclidean distance between (i, j) < r.
The jammer nodes can sense an ongoing transmission to decide whether or not nding on the power of the sensed signal. The assumption made have omnidirectional antennas with uniform power strength on each direction property of the sensors. The jammed area created by the reactive jammers on the centre of the network area, with a radius R, where jammer range R is r greater than the range of all the sensors in the network in order to achieve a powerful and efficient jammer model. All the sensors within this range will be jammed during the jammer wake period. The value of R can be calculated based on the positions of the boundary sensors and Another assumption is that any two jammer nodes are not in close to maximize the jammed area. explains the network 3 describes the by making use of group testing. by analysis of the time complexity involved along with evaluation of the time taken to execute the testing rounds and also the message consists of n sensor nodes and one base directional antennas, along with m radios that adds up to a power strength in each direction range of each sensor can be considered as a here any node pair ( i , j ) is or not to launch a assumption made here is that have omnidirectional antennas with uniform power strength on each direction y the reactive jammers R is required to be to achieve a powerful and efficient jammer model. All the sensors within this range will be jammed during the jammer wake-up the positions of the boundary sensors and Another assumption is that any two jammer nodes are not in close
The jamming status is utilised to categorise the sensor nodes into four types as shown in Figure  3 .Trigger Node TN is a sensor node which awakes the jammers, victim nodes VN are those within a distance R from an activated jammer, boundary nodes BN and un from the effect of jammers.
IMPLEMENTATION APPROACH USING IDENTIFICATION
Fig 4: Trigger identification procedure
Trigger identification service is mainly divided into three main steps first step executes anomaly detection where the base station detects impending reactive jamming attacks. Each boundary node identifies itself to the base station. In the second step jammer property estimation is performed where the base station calculates jamming range based on the location of boundary node. The third step is trigger detection where the base station broadcasts a short testing schedule message M to all the boundary nodes .Thereafter the boundary nodes keep broad jammed area for a period P.Subsequently the victim nodes locally execute the testing procedure based on M and identify themselves as trigger or nontrigger.
The non-adaptive Group Testing (GT) sophisticatedly grouping and testing the items in pools testing them. This way of groupin represent the testing group and each column refers to an item. M[i , j ] = 1 implies that the j participates in the ith testing group, and the number each group is represented as an outcome trigger in this testing group) and 1 is a positive result (possible triggers in the achieve the minimum testing length for non the union of any d columns does not contain any other column.
Step 1: Anomaly Detection is utilised to categorise the sensor nodes into four types as shown in Figure  3 .Trigger Node TN is a sensor node which awakes the jammers, victim nodes VN are those within a distance R from an activated jammer, boundary nodes BN and unaffected nodes are free
IMPLEMENTATION APPROACH USING TRIGGER
Fig 4: Trigger identification procedure
Trigger identification service is mainly divided into three main steps as shown in Figure 4 first step executes anomaly detection where the base station detects impending reactive jamming attacks. Each boundary node identifies itself to the base station. In the second step jammer property estimation is performed where the base station calculates the estimated jammed area and jamming range based on the location of boundary node. The third step is trigger detection where the base station broadcasts a short testing schedule message M to all the boundary nodes .Thereafter the boundary nodes keep broadcasting M to all the victim nodes within the estimated jammed area for a period P.Subsequently the victim nodes locally execute the testing procedure based on M and identify themselves as trigger or nontrigger.
adaptive Group Testing (GT) method can be used to minimize the testing sophisticatedly grouping and testing the items in pools simultaneously, instead of individually way of grouping is based on a 0-1 matrix Mt×n where the matrix rows each column refers to an item. M[i , j ] = 1 implies that the j testing group, and the number of testing is the number of rows. The result of an outcome vector with size t where 0 is a negative testing result (no nd 1 is a positive result (possible triggers in the testing testing length for non-adaptive GT, M is required to be d-disj s not contain any other column. is utilised to categorise the sensor nodes into four types as shown in Figure  3 .Trigger Node TN is a sensor node which awakes the jammers, victim nodes VN are those affected nodes are free as shown in Figure 4 . The first step executes anomaly detection where the base station detects impending reactive jamming attacks. Each boundary node identifies itself to the base station. In the second step jammer the estimated jammed area and jamming range based on the location of boundary node. The third step is trigger detection where the base station broadcasts a short testing schedule message M to all the boundary nodes casting M to all the victim nodes within the estimated jammed area for a period P.Subsequently the victim nodes locally execute the testing procedure an be used to minimize the testing period by f individually where the matrix rows each column refers to an item. M[i , j ] = 1 implies that the j th item of testing is the number of rows. The result of vector with size t where 0 is a negative testing result (no testing group). To disjunct, where Figure 5 shows the status report message having four tuples: Source_ID gives the ID of the sensor nodes, Time stamp indicates the sequence number, Label gi field indicates packet transmission time
In anomaly detection every sensor periodically sends a status report message to the base station.
There is a possibility that jammers allow report messages from the compromised sensors to be received by the base station. The base station can decide whether jamming attack has occurred in the network or not by comparing the ratio of received report to a predefined threshold.
Step 2: Jammer Property Estimation
The jammed area and jamming range D will be calculated by the base station by considering the location of boundary and victim nodes. In this work sparse distribution of jammers is relatively sparse and there is no overlap between the jammer nodes. By denoting the set of boundary nodes for the it estimated as (Xj,Yj)= { Where (X k ,Y k ) is the coordinate of a node k is the jammed area BN D= min{max( √(Xk-Xj)
Step 3:. Trigger Detection
The jammers immediately broadcast jamming signals once it senses the ongoing transmission by the sensors. The jammers are identified by trigger identification service. He schedule is adhered by all the victim nodes. the set of boundary nodes and the global topology. Information with regard to topology is stored as a message and broadcast to all bound each boundary node broadcasts the message by using simple flooding method to its adjoining jammed area. All victim nodes implement the testing schedule and specify themselves as trigger or non-trigger node. shows the status report message having four tuples: Source_ID gives the ID of the sensor ates the sequence number, Label gives present jamming status, field indicates packet transmission time and energy.
In anomaly detection every sensor periodically sends a status report message to the base station. There is a possibility that jammers may be activated during this period .This occurrence will not allow report messages from the compromised sensors to be received by the base station. The base station can decide whether jamming attack has occurred in the network or not by comparing the o of received report to a predefined threshold.
The jammed area and jamming range D will be calculated by the base station by considering the location of boundary and victim nodes. In this work sparse-jamming is considered where the distribution of jammers is relatively sparse and there is no overlap between the jammer nodes. By denoting the set of boundary nodes for the ith jammed area as BN i, the jammer coordinate can be } ) is the coordinate of a node k is the jammed area BN i and jamming range D is
The jammers immediately broadcast jamming signals once it senses the ongoing transmission by the sensors. The jammers are identified by trigger identification service. Here encrypted testing schedule is adhered by all the victim nodes. Scheduling will be done at the base station based on the set of boundary nodes and the global topology. Information with regard to topology is stored as a message and broadcast to all boundary nodes. After receiving the test scheduling message, each boundary node broadcasts the message by using simple flooding method to its adjoining jammed area. All victim nodes implement the testing schedule and specify themselves as trigger In anomaly detection every sensor periodically sends a status report message to the base station. may be activated during this period .This occurrence will not allow report messages from the compromised sensors to be received by the base station. The base station can decide whether jamming attack has occurred in the network or not by comparing the The jammed area and jamming range D will be calculated by the base station by considering the considered where the distribution of jammers is relatively sparse and there is no overlap between the jammer nodes. By the jammer coordinate can be (1) [20] and jamming range D is
The jammers immediately broadcast jamming signals once it senses the ongoing transmission by re encrypted testing Scheduling will be done at the base station based on the set of boundary nodes and the global topology. Information with regard to topology is stored test scheduling message, each boundary node broadcasts the message by using simple flooding method to its adjoining jammed area. All victim nodes implement the testing schedule and specify themselves as trigger As shown in algorithm above, the groups can decide to conduct group testing on themselves in m pipelines. If any jamming signals occur in pipeline ,then the current test will be stopped and the next test has to be scheduled. The groups receiving no jamming signals are required to resend triggering messages and wait until the predefined round time has passed.
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND RESULT ANALYSIS
The results of these experiments show that this solution is time efficient for identifying trigger nodes and defending reactive jamming attacks. The trigger identification procedure for reactive jamming in network simulator NS2 [21] on 900×900 square sensor field with n=10 sensor nodes has been simulated. The sensor nodes are uniformly distributed, with one base station and J 
Construct a (d,z)-disjunct matrix using ETG algorithm with T rows, and divide all the n victim nodes into T group accordingly {g1,g2,.....,gt}; // Group testing will be done for each round on m groups using m different channels. Here testing can be done in asynchronous manner ,the m group tested in parallel need not wait for each other to finish the testing, instead any finished test j will trigger the test j+m, i.e, the tests are conducted in m pipelines.
for i= 1 to [t/m] do
Conduct group testing in group gim+1,gim+2,gim+m in parallel; If any node in group gj with jЄ [im+1,im+m] detects jamming noises, finish the testing in this group and start testing on gj+m; If no nodes in group gj sense jamming noises, while at least one other test in parallel detects jamming noises, All the nodes in group gj resend more messages to set off possible hidden jammers;
If no jamming signals are detected till the end of the predefined round length (L) Return a negative outcome for this group and start testing on gj+m;
End distributed jammer nodes. In this work ,the sensor transmission radius r and jamming transmission R as 2r has been considered to achieve better efficiency of the jamming model. The transmission range(r) of ordinary sensor node is set as 50m while jammer transmission range(R) set to 100m(2r). Figure7 explains the protocol performance based on the variation in the numbers of jammers J in the network. In this test,N = 10 nodes with m = 3 radios, on a 900×900 network field have been considered where J ∈ [1, 5] jammers are uniformly deployed. Group testing employs a sophisticated technique to perform as many parallel tests as possible so that the estimated number of testing rounds T(sec) can be stable even though the number of jammers J increase. In order to show that the trigger identification service for reactive jamming attack is more efficient, group testing has been performed on different groups simultaneously for detecting the trigger node. With this reduction in time complexity can be demonstrated.Figure8 shows that time complexity can be reduced as the number of victim nodes that execute testing procedure in the group increase. This work considers simple status message transfers between the sensor node and base station that can provide reduction in message complexity as compared to AODV(Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector) which makes use of unnecessary bandwidth consumption due to periodic beaconing that leads to message overhead. Figure9 shows that message complexity is reduced in the case of implementation of the trigger identification service.
RELATED WORK
One of the reactive countermeasures uses Adapted Breadth-First Search Tree algorithm for identification of jammer node [13] . Here the base station broadcasts a message to all n nodes along a BFS tree. Once a node receives this message, it will set its corresponding entry to one. If the node senses that any one of the channels is jammed, another normal channel is used to transmit the broadcast message. The base station will receive a collection of messages from all Another approach for the detection and mapping of jammed area [14] has been proposed by Wood and Stankovic to increase network efficiency. However, this method has several drawbacks: first, it cannot practically defend in the situation that the attacker jams the entire network; second, in case the attacker targets some specific nodes i.e. those that guard a security entrance to obstruct their data transmission, then this technique fails to protect the nodes under attack.
Xu [15] proposed two strategies against jammers i.e, channel surfing and spatial retreat. Channel surfing is adaptive form of FHSS. Instead of switching continuously from one channel to another, a node switches to a channel only when it discovers that the current channel is free from jammer. The spatial retreat method makes two nodes to move in diverse ways with separation atleast equal to Manhattan distances [16] to get away from a jammed region. The disadvantages of the above mentioned methods are that they are valuable only for constant jammers and they have no effect on reactive jamming.
The concept of Wormhole [17] can be used to bypass the jammed areas which disturb the regular communication of the sensor nodes. These solutions can only effectively reduce the intensity of the jamming attacks, but their performance depends on the accuracy of detection of the jammed areas, i.e. transmission overhead would be needlessly involved if the jammed area is much larger than its actual size. Victim nodes cannot efficiently avoid jamming signals because they do not possess knowledge over possible positions of hidden reactive jammer nodes, especially in dense sensor networks This paper proposes a fresh implementation move towards defence of the network against reactive jamming attack i.e. trigger identification service [18] [19] . This can be considered as a lightweight mechanism because all the calculations are done at the base station. This approach attempts to reduce the transmission overhead as well as the time complexity. The advantage that this approach seeks to achieve is the elimination of additional hardware requirement. The requirement of the mechanism is to send simple status report messages from each sensor and the information regarding the geographic locations of all sensors maintained at the base station.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, a novel trigger identification service for reactive jamming attack in wireless sensor network is introduced to achieve minimum time and message overhead. The status report message are transferred between the base station and all sensor nodes . For isolating reactive jammer in the network a trigger identification service is introduced, which requires all testing groups to schedule the trigger node detection algorithm using group testing after anomaly detection. By identifying the trigger nodes in the network, reactive jammers can be eliminated by making trigger nodes as only receivers. This detection scheme is thus well-suited for the protection of the sensor network against the reactive jammer. Furthermore, investigation into more stealthy and energy efficient jamming models with simulations indicates robustness of the present proposed scheme. The result can be stored in the network for further operations i.e. to perform best routing operation without jamming. This work achieves the elimination of attackers to maintain the soundness of wireless sensor networks.
